- The International Civil Aviation Organization has condemned Russia and North Korea’s interference in the GNSS, highlighting the growing threat to civil aviation and commercial air cargo, including jamming and spoofing that disrupts navigation, safety systems and passenger services.
- Airlines and operators are adopting operational and technological mitigation measures, such as flight rerouting, crew training, multi-frequency receivers, controlled receive pattern antennas, and inertial navigation systems, to maintain safe operations despite interference.
- GNSS disruptions have broader supply chain and economic impacts, affecting routing, fuel planning, autonomous aircraft, and shipping efficiency, leading to calls for resilient navigation technologies, standardized reporting, and coordinated responses between industry and government.
The United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has adopted resolutions condemning interference in global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) by Russia and North Korea, and reaffirming the principle of interference-free civil aviation. These decisions follow applications submitted to the ITU Radio Regulations Board in June by Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, citing harmful interference affecting aircraft operating over the Baltic Sea.
GNSS interference incidents are increasingly being reported outside conflict zones, affecting commercial operations and air cargo networks. “GNSS interference is not new, but its expansion beyond conflict zones creates operational challenges for civil aviation and commercial markets,” said Lisa Dyer, Executive Director of the GPS Global Innovation Alliance. She explained that jamming and spoofing events can affect multiple aircraft systems, requiring intervention by flight crews.
A September 2024 OpsGroup report documented incidents where spoofing disrupted navigation, enhanced ground proximity warning, and passenger Wi-Fi systems. The report noted that restoring accurate location data may require a full system reset. Dyer emphasized that the jamming devices are random: “Most of them are cheap and wide-ranging, and emit signals in every direction. They do not distinguish between military and civilian aircraft.”
ICAO resolutions encourage States to improve monitoring and exchange of information related to GNSS interference and to consider mitigation measures. Operators can incorporate multiple strategies, including multi-frequency receivers and specialized antennas, Dyer said: “Introducing additional frequencies into receivers and incorporating controlled receive pattern antennas can reduce exposure to jamming and spoofing events.”
Experts warn that GNSS interference is increasingly linked to hybrid warfare tactics. “In June 2025, Russia acknowledged jamming operations affecting civilian receivers in the Baltic Sea, and indicated they would continue due to military concerns,” Dyer noted. She added that proactive technical and operational measures are necessary to ensure uninterrupted navigation. “Civil aviation relies on repetition, but these incidents show that we cannot achieve safety without active countermeasures,” Dyer said.
Operational risks and industry responses
Airlines and air cargo operators are adjusting their operations to mitigate GNSS interference. The changes include rerouting flights, increasing communication with air traffic control, and ensuring crews are trained to recognize and respond to spoofing or jamming events. “Every aircraft is different, but some systems can experience cascading effects when spoofed, affecting navigation, safety and even passenger services on board,” Dyer said.
Rerouting results in fuel and schedule costs, with implications for the wider supply chain. “Using GNSS allows operators to follow the most efficient route,” Dyer explained. “Deviation due to interference increases operating costs, which pass through shippers and consumers.” She highlighted the unpredictability of intervention patterns: “Intervention does not respect conflict zones. Civilian and commercial operations in the Arctic, the Baltic, or the Mediterranean could be affected, regardless of the presence of local hostilities.”
Technological mitigation is under development. Some carriers are exploring how to combine multi-frequency receivers and controlled receive pattern antennas to reduce exposure to targeted interference.
“Tests show that combining these technologies significantly increases the ability to resist jamming and spoofing,” Dyer said. The use of inertial navigation systems in conjunction with GNSS provides additional redundancy.
Air traffic controllers are also a key line of defense. While crews can contact control towers to resolve issues, staffing shortages and heavy workloads can complicate responses, Dyer noted. “All public safety employees are very focused, but the intervention increases the complexity of their operations,” she said. “With the proper integration of technology and training, the industry can operate safely even in affected airspace,” Dyer added.
Supply chain and sector impacts
GNSS interference also impacts shipping logistics and the emerging use of autonomous aircraft. Autonomous systems without human supervision may be particularly vulnerable, Dyer said: “For autonomous aircraft operating beyond visual line of sight, spoofing can introduce additional risks, as these systems rely entirely on accurate navigational data.”
Industry groups are developing multi-band satellite systems and low-Earth orbit positioning technologies that operate at different frequencies to provide alternative navigation signals. “If jammers focus on L-band GNSS signals, using transmitting systems in additional bands, such as C-band, allows for continuity of navigation, similar to how inertial and GPS systems integrate with each other,” Dyer explained.
Operational disruptions can affect route selection, fuel planning and transit times. Dyer emphasized the wider economic impact: “Even small intrusive incidents increase costs across supply chains, reducing efficiency in both passenger and cargo operations.” It called on governments to support flexible navigation techniques and enforce measures against deliberate interference.
Looking to the future, ICAO expects expanded monitoring, standardized reporting and collaborative mitigation measures. “The aviation sector cannot rely on an accident to motivate action,” Dyer concluded. “Redundant systems and skilled crews are essential, but incorporating technological flexibility now is critical to preventing accidents.”
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